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The issue of ethical conduct in research settings is important 
and complex. As tenure-track researchers who study gendered 
violence, we found Clark and Walker’s discussion provocative, 
complex, and interesting. They urge researchers to attend both to the 
structural dynamics of research carried out under the pressures of 
tenure and promotion while advocating an ethical frame that draws 
attention to the limited definition of risk or harm that animates typical 
human subjects research. Victims of violence, they argue, should not 
be subjected to a standardized understanding of risk. A broader 
framework is needed, one which brings into conversation virtue ethics 
with consequentialist and ontological frameworks. Given the 
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impossible task of responding to the many points discussed by Clark 
and Walker, we chose to focus on four areas. In all likelihood, these 
areas of discussion reflect our own interests rather than Clark and 
Walker’s, but challenged to think seriously about research ethics in 
victimization studies, we attend to the following points.  
 
First, we seek to put virtue ethics in conversation with care 
ethics, in part because care ethics formed an important component of 
feminist discourse during the historical period in which institutional 
review boards came into being. While virtue ethics may have lost its 
masculinist inflection after shedding its etymological roots,i care ethics 
was explicitly seen as suited for the feminist subject. Following our 
discussion of care ethics, we address the question of setting victims of 
violence apart as a special class of vulnerable human research 
subjects. We argue that such a designation may yield more problems 
than it does solutions. Next, we turn to the violence of epistemology as 
a concern in research ethics. How do we come to an ethical definition 
of the research object, and to whom are we accountable? Finally, we 
turn to the relation of care when carrying out ethically and 
methodologically sound research projects.  
 
Virtue Ethics, Feminism, and Care Ethics  
 
In their paper, Clark and Walker propose widening the frame of 
research ethics in victimization research by calling attention to the 
applicability of a virtues based ethics theory (p. 6) to address 
contemporary ethical demands that far exceed principle-based 
practice. In conflict with this position, the ethics framework that guides 
Western research is based on Kantian moral theory of the universal 
rational subject. Embedded in principle-based research ethics, United 
States Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are charged with protecting 
the rights and safety of research participants primarily based on risk-
benefit analyses. As Clark and Walker state, “Principlism’s attraction is 
that rule-following allows researchers and institutions to believe they 
derive the benefits of rigorous, ethical thinking without needing to 
actually think about ethics” (p. 10-11). Debates about ethics and 
moral theory have a long history and not surprisingly, much of the 
original feminist research on ethics was published in the 1980s 
coinciding with the establishment of many university IRBs. Certainly, 
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virtue ethicists and feminists alike have argued that ethical thinking 
provides a framework to guide decision making contrary to mere rules 
or regulations.  
 
A discussion of ethical research practice with victims of violence 
must attend to the vast body of work on care ethics and virtue ethics. 
Feminist ethics developed in response to said universal standards of 
Western epistemology, arguing against established rational-choice 
frameworks based on objective/subjective binaries, 
reductive/deductive reasoning, and hierarchical relationships between 
the researcher and research “subject” (e.g., Gilligan 1982; Harding 
1986, 1991; Harding and Norberg 2005; Noddings 1984; Smith 1987). 
This tension is embodied in the Kohlbeg and Gilligan debates that drew 
attention to moral decision making beyond obligation or principle. 
While Kohlberg (1981) argued that ethical and moral persons act out 
of universalist rights, virtues or obligations, Gilligan (1982) argued 
that decision making was also based on an ethic of care, privileging 
the relationship, particular, relative, and subjective over the principle, 
abstract, absolute, and objective. An ethic of care is complicated and 
contextual, and caring is affective rather than principled, depending on 
empathy and receptiveness (Noddings 1984). Virtue ethics focus on 
moral agents rather than actions, and emphasizes being and intention. 
Moral character then is privileged over consequence. In more recent 
literatures, ethicists have attempted to merge care ethics with virtue 
ethics. Debates center on their compatibility, definitions of care as 
virtue in terms of motives or consequences, relational ontology, and 
theories of justice (see Sander-Staudt 2006). While a thorough review 
of these debates is beyond the scope of this commentary, Sander-
Staudt (2006) distinguishes between the positioning of care in virtue 
ethics and care ethics, the pragmatism of care, and the distinct role of 
relational ontology. Ultimately, neither care ethics nor virtue ethics 
eliminates moral and ethical dilemmas. Rather, they are understood as 
models for researchers to draw upon in specific contexts of ethical 
complexity during the research process. Further, neither care nor 
virtue ethics excludes consideration of principle.  
 
This long established scholarly debate, engaging with and 
challenging research hierarchies, remains focused on abstract 
principles rather than virtue or caring. Despite efforts to elucidate 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Violence Against Women, Vol 17, No. 12 (December 2011): pg. 1509-1520. DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
SAGE Publications. 
4 
 
knowledge from particular standpoints (Keller 1985; DeVault 1999; 
Harding 1991; Smith 1987) the regulatory effect has been to err on 
the side of homogenization of the ethical approach and the research 
object. In fact, IRBs position participants as the “object” of study or 
the generalized “other,” assuming shared, identifiable and consistent 
characteristics (e.g., defining and sampling a research population of 
victims). In the next section, we explore the complications attached to 
designating victims of violence as a special class of vulnerable human 
subjects.  
 
Victims of Partner Violence as a Class of 
Vulnerable Human Subjects  
 
Clark and Walker begin their call for a more broad approach to 
research ethics in research on victims of violence by expressing their 
concern over the lack of a specialized status of “vulnerable human 
subject” for victims of partner violence (p. 3). Though they do not 
explicitly argue that there ought to be such a designation in federal 
research regulations, its prominence within the article suggests that 
this is a serious consideration for Clark and Walker. The notion of 
victims of violence, specifically victims of intimate partner violence, as 
a specially designated class of vulnerable human subjects invites many 
questions. Invited to adopt a virtue ethics approach towards ethical 
comportment in research, we are urged to think of the character of the 
moral agent (p. 6). Within a given research setting, we can identify at 
least two moral agents: the researcher and the research participant. 
Clark and Walker thoroughly discuss the moral agency of researchers; 
hence, we turn our attention to the research participant. If we infer a 
suggestion to “ontologize” the subject from Clark and Walker’s 
criticism of regulatory structures grounded in deontological theories (p. 
9), we can participate in the exercise of emphasizing the state of being 
described as “victim.” Towards that end, the two primary questions we 
will pose here address the temporality and duration of victim status 
and the capacity of vulnerable subjects to consent to participate in 
research.  
 
We come to these questions by direct comparison of victims of 
violence with the other classes of research subjects who carry a special 
designation as vulnerable research subjects within federal regulations. 
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As Clark and Walker state, these include prisoners, pregnant women, 
fetuses, neonates and children. Typically, these designations are all 
bound within time. That is, there is a finite window in which one is a 
prisoner, a pregnant woman, a fetus, a neonate or a child. How long, 
then, does the status of victim of violence inhere? Are individuals who 
have experienced violence perpetually marked as victims for the 
duration of their lifetimes? Or are we only referring to individuals who 
are actively being victimized within an intimate partner setting at the 
time of their participation in the research project? Given that many 
studies are conducted in the aftermath of violence, particularly those 
studies that evaluate the role of legal and clinical interventions into 
violence, it seems that researchers encounter victims of violence at 
various temporal “distances” from the event (or an event) of 
victimization. Thus, the vulnerability of the subject would have to be 
assessed and reassessed unless one assumes it as a constant. In other 
words, the formula introduced by Clark and Walker would benefit from 
either a temporal “co-efficient” or a periodic recalculation (p. 18).  
 
Faced with two equally untenable options, either casting victims 
in a permanent state of victimhood, or assigning a singular (temporal) 
criteria for leaving behind the status of victim, it becomes immediately 
apparent that classing victims of violence as a distinctive category is a 
slippery task. Feminist scholars have approached the question of the 
designations of “victim” from many different perspectives (Alcoff and 
Gray 1993; Lamb 1999; Mardorossian 2003). When do victims become 
survivors? What criteria are relevant in making this distinction? Who is 
empowered to make this distinction? These questions animate the 
debates over the meaning and permanence of victim status. For some, 
the identifiers “victim” or “survivor” can only be self-designated (Alcoff 
and Gray 1993: 262), while for others, continued deployment of the 
term “victim” is seen as paternalistic and diminishing of the agency of 
the subject (Lamb 1999: 9).  
 
This points us to the question of agency of the research subject. 
Turning back to Clark and Walker’s call to take seriously the moral 
agency of the ethical actors in a research setting, we must consider 
victims of violence as moral agents. Once again, comparing victims of 
violence to other classes of vulnerable human subjects proves a useful 
exercise. The vulnerability of prisoners, pregnant women, neonates, 
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fetuses and children is partly understood as a diminished capacity to 
consent to participate in research (Kipnis 2001; Zion, Gillam and Loff 
2000: 616). Prisoners are seen as potentially coerced through the 
structural conditions of imprisonment. Pregnant women may not be 
attenuated to the added health risks of research, nor are they to 
commit to research participation that may harm the unborn-- the 
aforementioned fetuses and neonates who do not speak for 
“themselves.” Children, who we view as agentive (Hlavka 2010; Prout 
2000), are frequently considered to have a diminished capacity to 
consent because they have not attained an adult’s faculty of reason 
and thus are unable to comprehend the potential harms and 
consequences that may unfold as a result of participate in research. If 
we consider the victim of violence in relation to her capacity to consent 
to participate in research, we see a danger in assuming that she has a 
diminished or impaired capacity to consent.  
 
If we think about the interventions that typically attend intimate 
partner violence, the primary goal is often to empower the victim 
(Kasturirangan 2008). In cases of sexual violence, establishing and 
respecting the victim’s capacity to consent is the very crux of both 
strategies to empower the victim as well as any legal case that 
subsequently unfolds. A rape victim within the setting of a formal 
intervention must consent to medical care and participation in the 
criminal justice process. Assuming a victim’s diminished capacity to 
consent to participation in research requires us to differentiate 
between the victim as legal subject, medical subject, and potential 
research subject, fracturing the subject in a way that may prove 
epistemologically problematic in terms of our research agendas. Some 
may argue that research participation does not carry with it the same 
urgency and importance as accessing health care and reporting to the 
police, and this is a legitimate critique. However, it is here where our 
own research, respectively on children reporting sexual abuse and 
adult sexual assault forensic interventions, comes to bear.  
 
Clark and Walker point out that victims of violence may come to 
have false expectations of the impact of the research in which they 
participate (p. 12-13). In our own experience, we have seen false 
expectations nurtured and encouraged not only by researchers, but by 
the legal and therapeutic establishments. For example, rape victims 
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who report to the police and undergo forensic examination are 
frequently surprised with the low rates of subsequent contact with the 
police department (Chen and Ullman 2010). Rather than disclose this 
statistical reality to victims, legal and medical personnel will frequently 
advocate and encourage victims to participate in the forensic 
examination and make a police report. Is the victim in these settings 
making an informed decision to consent? Within a virtue ethics frame, 
researchers should not participate in the same types of false promises 
in which we guarantee particular outcomes or impacts. It is impossible 
to anticipate our research findings, the success or failures of our 
dissemination plans, or the impact of our research. We are 
accountable for making full disclosures of these uncertainties so that 
research participants are empowered to make informed decisions to 
opt into or out of research. Such disclosures assist the victim as moral 
agent in making an informed decision. However, we think there is 
harm in assuming a diminished capacity of all victims of violence to 
consent—particularly in cases of sexual violence in which it is the 
capacity to consent which is itself being reaffirmed.  
 
Finally, we face the challenge that the status and characteristics 
of victims, or particularly groups of victims, is frequently our research 
object. In studying victims, we embark on agendas of inquiry that 
query existing stereotypes or constructs of victimhood, and seek to 
illuminate underlying realities as opposed to validating a priori 
assumptions. Creating a regulatory designation that classes victims of 
violence as vulnerable research subjects introduces an a priori 
epistemological category, one which may predetermine our research 
findings and ultimately lead to the non-rigorous or problematic 
research findings of which Clark and Walker are deeply critical (p. 22). 
These are only one of several epistemological concerns Clark and 
Walker raise in their piece.  
 
Epistemic Violence and Ethnographic Directions  
 
Defining victims of violence as a particular class of subject is not 
the sole epistemological concern impacting research on intimate 
partner and sexual violence. In this section, we will address the 
dangers of epistemic violence, the potential of interdisciplinary 
research, and ethnographic methodologies. By addressing Stark’s 
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critique of clinical research on battered women’s syndrome, Clark and 
Walker present a very unsettling picture of the dangers of epistemic 
violence (Spivak 1998: 280). Briefly, our understanding of epistemic 
violence, drawing on Spivak’s classic example, is that of a subaltern 
defined by a Western epistemology that defines and delimits the 
subaltern’s ‘voice’ in a way that does not encapsulate the subaltern’s 
subject position as viewed from the subaltern’s perspective. Here, both 
the subaltern’s subjective position and their epistemological traditions 
are marginalized. Feminist standpoint theorists have addressed a 
similar range of concerns (Collins 1998; Smith 1999). Spivak does not 
limit epistemic violence to the context post-colonial studies, but draws 
particular attention to the vulnerability of women as research objects 
(Spivak 1998: 299). Women, she argues, are even more vulnerable to 
the epistemic violence of patriarchal Western constructs.  
 
Let us now return to Clark and Walker’s innate critique of 
epistemic violence in their introduction of Stark’s research. Stark 
draws attention to the U.S. legal system’s evidentiary standard derived 
from clinical research on battered women’s syndrome, a standard that 
excludes many battered women whose presentations differ from the 
clinical profile advanced by researchers (p. 25). In this example, the 
narrowly defined research object, “battered women’s syndrome,” 
calcifies such that it acquires an epistemic solidity that defies 
flexibility, permeability and variation. Thus, a subject, the person 
suffering from battered women’s syndrome, is produced through the 
narrowly defined criteria that limit the ways in which battered women’s 
syndrome operates within the legal system. The violence of singular 
epistemic constructs extends beyond research contexts in which 
research comes to bear on interventions. In research on gender 
violence, ethical guidelines frequently suggest that research findings 
must be faithful enough to research participant’s accounts that they 
are able to recognize their own narratives within the research outputs 
(Hall and Stevens 1991). This is particularly true where studies purport 
to represent the voices of victims. The potential for violence arises 
when victims, subjected to epistemic categories and understandings 
that do not fully encapsulate their experiences, do not recognize 
themselves in the research product (Mulla 2008). Thus, the battered 
women’s syndrome survivors need never be denied access to this 
diagnosis in court in order to be harmed. Their experiences can be 
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alienated and invalidated by the process of research itself. These 
undesirable outcomes are further complicated within research that 
seeks knowledge of victim subjectivity and meaning-making (Das and 
Kleinman 1997: 17; Kleinman 2006: 212). When the goal of a 
research study is to increase understanding of victim subjectivity and 
meaning-making practices, epistemic violence is both unethical and 
also failed research.  
 
Avoiding the trap of designing a research methodology that is 
prone to epistemic violence is a challenge. Precision in defining our 
research objects is, indeed, frequently implicit in our desires for rigor. 
In our own research, how do we achieve the multi-stranded (or many 
fibered) modality of inquiry advocated by those like Wittgenstein 
(1957 §67 as cited in Clark and Walker)? Wittgenstein was fond of the 
comparison between the life-world and weaving, and alludes to this 
analogy at multiple points within the Philosophical Investigations 
(1957 §362). Thus, the pursuit of knowledge about the life-world was 
akin to unraveling the many fibers of a twined rope. Contrast this 
approach of unraveling with treating the rope as if it were one solid 
and singular object. Another analogy Wittgenstein uses within the 
Investigations is that of digging in the dirt. When we pick up a shovel 
to dig, he states, we could either think of ourselves as aiming to dig 
until we hit bedrock or simply turning over the earth (1957 §217). It is 
the second model, that of turning over the earth, that appeals to 
Wittgenstein. Aiming for bedrock may result in definitive and high-
impact research, but it closes the door of future inquiry by presuming 
that there are no questions that ought to be pursued beyond the 
immediate research agenda. As with Stark’s example of battered 
women’s syndrome, such presumptions can result in a problematic and 
dangerous violence whereas continued inquiry would benefit scholars, 
research subjects, policy makers, and participants in the legal system.  
 
Incorporating lessons from philosophy into the way we think 
about and conduct social science research is about far more than 
merely introducing a new jargon (Das 1998: 172). Philosophical 
concepts do not easily translate into social science thinking. Their 
potential contribution lies in helping researchers “to introduce a 
hesitancy in the way in which we habitually dwell among our concepts” 
(Ibid). If our approach to conducting research through a mode of 
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open-ended inquiry is the first step towards introducing hesitations 
that may lead to more ethical research, it has been our experience 
that interdisciplinary collaboration is a second constructive area in 
pursuing ethical research conduct with victims of violence. No single 
discipline has a monopoly on the study of intimate partner and sexual 
violence. Compelling research has been carried out by sociologists, 
criminologists, anthropologists, political scientists, social workers, 
psychologists, historians, and many others. Each discipline pursues 
different, though often overlapping, methodologies. There are many 
advantages and challenges to pursuing interdisciplinary collaboration 
and research, but again, we will limit our discussion to epistemic 
violence.  
 
If the calcification and over-determination of research objects is 
what we seek to avoid, interdisciplinary research can aid us in 
approaching the research object through a deliberative process rather 
than succumb to the convenient habit of using a priori categories. 
Faced with an interlocutor who is oriented to a different epistemology 
than our own, we must justify the epistemic construct with which we 
are most familiar. There is also more incentive to diligently review a 
broader range of literature without the excuse of only working within 
one discipline, a problem to which Clark and Walker attend with great 
detail (p. 20). As an anthropologist and a criminologist working within 
sociological traditions, we frequently spend many frustrated hours 
setting a research agenda that can be justified within both of our home 
disciplines. Rather than regard this as burden, our experience has 
been that these deliberative processes lead to new and interesting 
approaches to the study of gendered violence in our society. For 
example, we have moved away from analyses of the event of violence 
itself—an epistemic object that does not easily lend itself to analysis, 
nor to generalizable findings. Instead, we find ourselves working in 
institutional structures that reify and validate particular experiences of 
suffering violence, such as the courtroom or the forensic examination 
(Mulla 2008).  
 
A discussion of how we determine our epistemic constructs 
inevitability leads to consideration of the tendency of research 
structures to privilege so-called “scientific” models of research over 
other models. Scientific standards dictate which studies will be 
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published and which excluded (p. 27). Applied research, Clark and 
Walker state, is given short shrift while clinical trials rule within 
medical journals. We argue for a broader understanding of the 
scientific method, one that embraces both experimental models while 
valuing the observational model, particularly as it applies to human 
behavior, culture and society. Observational science has a home within 
ethnographic methodology, an old tradition that replaces the 
certainties of the scientific experiment with the patience of longitudinal 
research plans, open-ended research questions, and a density and 
depth of data that can only be yielded through such long term 
commitments. There are risks that come with ethnographic research—
as Stacey pointed out, in a more sustained research relationship there 
are more opportunities for ethical complications (Stacey 1988). There 
have been many thoughtful responses and objections to Stacey’s 
regard of ethnography as problematic. What Stacey regards as 
increased risk through extended contact with research participants, we 
regard as increased accountability. Though short term research 
commitments may yield fewer immediate ethical violations in the 
interactions between researcher and research participant, in studying 
gendered violence, risk does not end in the moment the research 
encounter ends. Nor is the harm that may ensue limited only to the 
research participant, as Clark and Walker have already demonstrated. 
Thus, ethnographic models may allow for fruitful research processes 
that test the stability of research findings over longer periods of time, 
while engendering more reliable research objects that have withstood 
the course of longer research engagements. Ethnographers would be 
well-positioned to take up Clark and Walker’s challenge to “imagine 
the daily life of, for example, a young woman who is being stalked, a 
penniless, battered mother of three small children living in a shelter, 
or a woman lying in a doorway after being raped and dumped in the 
street--these images might evoke the kind of care and curiosity that 
would lead to more fruitful scientific concerns embedded in a 
fundamental desire to not make their lives any worse” (p. 14). 
Attending to a more complete sense of the life-world of research 
subjects allows researchers an informed sense of the ethical issues at 
hand.  
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Care as an Epistemological Cornerstone  
 
Controversies about relations between knowledge and power in 
research methods and practices have long been teased out in feminist 
and social theory. Epistemological questions have included: What is 
knowledge? Whose knowledge is it? Who decides what problems and 
conditions are worthy of study? How is knowledge produced and 
disseminated? Feminists from varying perspectives have pointed to 
possible solutions including standpoint theory, mentioned earlier, and 
participatory action research. Though unable to eliminate power 
differentials, these methodologies work to address the power relations 
between researcher and research participants and their communities. 
Clark and Walker, too, invite researchers to address the ethics of the 
entire research enterprise (p. 30) including the research purpose and 
design, staff training and education, and research publication. From 
this position, the research enterprise ought to then privilege 
contextual, experientially-based knowledge and intersubjectivity 
(Fonow and Cook 1991; Stanley and Wise 1993). We argue that the 
moral agent must be intentional, reflexive and imaginative in a 
prolonged process of ethical and moral query that attends to both 
motive and to ends. She cannot be content with questions of being 
and intention.  
 
Privileging both intention and outcome embeds the entire 
research process in a relational, reflexive, and at times, transformative 
endeavor. Viewing this process as intersubjective problematizes how 
the researcher might go about, intentionally, her scientific practice 
without attending to a chorus of voices and shared meanings. Ethical 
research practice will largely depend on the qualities and skills of the 
researcher(s). Such skills stress interdependence and responsibility 
and include respect, empathy, imagination, authenticity and as Clark 
and Walker state, adaptive thinking (p. 29). Ethical practice 
constitutes a host of activities not limited to: immersing oneself in the 
literature; dwelling on discussions and controversies in the field (such 
as calls for research on women’s violent behavior in relationships 
[Renzetti 1999]; same-sex relationship violence; and men as victims 
of partner violence); anticipating potential ethical conundrums during 
the course of research and possible responses; encouraging and 
developing the reflexivity necessary to question the consequences of 
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one’s position and biography in relation to others, the research 
environment, and the broader academic enterprise; engaging in the 
dialogic exercise of learning from the reflexive research practices of 
others; and allowing participants and their embodied communities to 
take part in the research process including informing the research 
problem and process to be studied (e.g., participatory action 
research), informing staff training and education (e.g., Campbell et al. 
2009) as well as the final research product. 
 
Shifting focus away from a hierarchical, detached and objective 
relationship to one of virtue, care and connectedness requires 
flexibility. Surely we are all aware of the extent to which the 
researcher is never in full control of her research process, participants, 
or environment. With new knowledges that recognize the intersectional 
identities of victims of partner violence, we must be prepared for an 
ever shifting field of study and thus, unstable “population” 
characteristics. Contrary to Kohlberg’s universalist virtues, we argue 
that virtues, too, are engendered in communities and are grounded in 
particular times and locations. Without detracting from the importance 
of literature reviews, part of a reflexive and relational practice must 
account for the fluidity of identity. We argue that it is untenable at 
best, to quantifiably rank said characteristics to form vulnerability 
classifications. Instead, these countless contingencies and complexities 
ought to be embraced and reflected in research projects and designs 
and can be assessed in part by the literature, practice communities, 
and field experiences of both research participants and researchers 
(e.g., Campbell 2002; Campbell et al. 2009). Finally, we briefly return 
to Clark and Walker’s concerns about the role of scientific journals and 
how they directly bear upon the ethical outcomes and the practice of 
care. Clark and Walker point to barriers to publication on partner 
violence in high impact and mainstream journals (pp. 27-28). This 
issue also extends beyond the research environment to larger practice 
communities. The positionality and biography of the researcher plays a 
central role in the final text (analysis, interpretation, evaluation) and 
dissemination of research. How will participants be represented? Who 
will receive the information and in what form? Approaching such 
questions from a care ethics framework adds an additional layer. Who 
likely engages in the practice of care and justice with victims of 
partner violence? The practice of giving and receiving care – whether 
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we consider research, publication, education or service – is not 
gender-neutral. The dissemination of “care” research then closely 
accords with wider care practices and can be more deeply challenged 
along these lines. We invite researchers to use explicitly gendered and 
structural frameworks to explore journal hierarchies and information 
dissemination strategies.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Clark and Walker have issued a worthwhile challenge to all 
researchers to widen the lens of research ethics in our work with 
victims of violence. Lest it seem that we are advocating the 
substitution of one ethical lens, that of virtue ethics, with another, that 
of care ethics, we suggest that no single ethical tradition is sufficient to 
the task of maintaining high ethical standards for research conduct. 
These tools, for one, come to us from philosophy, whereas we are 
functioning in the world of ideas as well as in our own complex life-
worlds and those of our research participants. We view these 
participants as legitimate stakeholders within these research 
processes—the studies we publish are accountable to their critiques 
and understandings. When we purport to study victimization, we must 
consider the intersubjective construction of the category “victim”—this 
imperative is both to the benefit of our ethical standards as well as our 
research standards. To suspect the victim of violence as possessing a 
compromised capacity to consent is deeply problematic, again from 
both an epistemological and an ethical standard. Finally, sustained 
contact with research participants enables more accountability and 
allows for longitudinal scrutiny of the research object as well as 
research findings. Such regard for our research participants and the 
incorporation of ethnographic methodology, as well as interdisciplinary 
collaboration, will help us avoid epistemic violence. While we may 
never come to perfect solutions in our desire to attain high standards 
of ethical conduct, we can at least do as Das (1998) asks and give our 
research participants the benefit of our deliberate hesitation as we 
engage in the enterprise of research.  
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i Vir is Latin for man. Virtue indicated qualities of manliness. In the 
Aristotelian tradition, all free males had the potential to become 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Violence Against Women, Vol 17, No. 12 (December 2011): pg. 1509-1520. DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
SAGE Publications. 
17 
 
virtuous. Though the contemporary concept of virtue theory has 
drifted away from Aristotle’s roots, its predisposition towards 
masculine ideals is part of its genealogy.   
